If the world makes the right choices now - at this time of destiny - we will get there. And Britain will be at Americas side in doing it.
It is a great privilege to be here today at the Bush Presidential Library before such a distinguished audience， and let me begin by paying tribute to two of the most distinguished members.
First， to you， Mr President. It is quite something to raise the son who goes on to be US President. To do so having been President yourself， one with a proud record of leadership and achievement， is quite another. I want to thank you for inviting me， thank you for being here， and thank you for your steadfast friendship of Great Britain.
And Jim Baker was one of the most remarkable Secretaries of State the US has ever had during a remarkable period of your history， and I am honoured that a statesman of his standing should be present to hear my speech on issues he has studied for far longer than I have.
The only purpose of being in politics is to strive for the values and ideals we believe in： freedom， justice， what we Europeans call solidarity but you might call respect for and help for others. These are the decent democratic values we all avow. But alongside the values we know we need a hard headed pragmatism - a realpolitik - required to give us any chance of translating those values into the practical world we live in.
The same tension exists in the two views of international affairs. One is utilitarian： each nation maximises its own self interest. The other is Utopian： we try to create a better world. Today I want to suggest that more than ever before those two views are merging.
I advocate an enlightened self interest that puts fighting for our values right at the heart of the policies necessary to protect our nations. Engagement in the world on the basis of these values， not isolationism from it is the hard-headed pragmatism for the 21st Century.
Why？ In part it is because the countries and people of the world today are more interdependent than ever. That calls for an approach of integration. When I spoke about this issue in Chicago in 1999 and called it a doctrine of international community， people hesitated over what appeared to be Panglossian idealism. At the time， the major international crisis we faced was Kosovo， where a brutal dictator， Slobodan Milosevic， was embarked upon a programme of ethnic cleansing of innocent people - in this case， Muslims - the likes of which Europe had not seen since the Nazis.
Yet we were told： it's not our fight， why bother？ there's nothing we can do； if we try to stop him， the region will explode； we will strengthen his hand， he will win； or he'll lose but be succeeded by someone worse. Sound familiar？ Today thousands of refugees have gone back. Kosovo has held its first elections. Montenegro and Serbia are being reconciled. Milosevic is on trial charged with war crimes. There is a democratic government in Belgrade and the whole region， despite the massive problems which still exist， is on a path， albeit slowly， towards the EU.
It's still costing us time， effort and money， but it's a lot less than if we had turned our back and let the Balkans plunge into civil war.
In truth， it is very rare today that trouble in one part of the globe remains limited in its effect. Not just in security， but in trade and finance - witness the crisis of 1998 which began in Thailand and ended in Brazil - the world is interlocked.
This is heightened by mass communications and technology. In Queen Victoria's time， reports of battles came back weeks or months after they were won or lost. Today we see them enacted live on the BBC， Sky or CNN. Their very visibility， immediate and in technicolour， inflame feelings that can spread worldwide across different ethnic， religious and cultural communities.
So today， more than ever， “their” problem becomes “our” problem. Instability is contagious and， again today， more than ever， nations， at least most of them， crave stability. That's for a simple reason. Our people want it， because without it， they can't do business and prosper. What brings nations together - what brought them together post September 11 - is the international recognition that the world needs order. Disorder is the enemy of progress.
The struggle is for stability， for the security within which progress can be made. Of course， countries want to protect their territorial integrity but few are into empire-building. This is especially true of democracies whose people vote for higher living standards and punish governments who don't deliver them. For 2，000 years Europe fought over territory.
Today boundaries are virtually fixed. Governments and people know that any territorial ambition threatens stability， and instability threatens prosperity.
And of course the surest way to stability is through the very values of freedom， democracy and justice. Where these are strong， the people push for moderation and order. Where they are absent， regimes act unchecked by popular accountability and pose a threat； and the threat spreads.
So the promotion of these values becomes not just right in itself but part of our long-term security and prosperity. We can't intervene in every case. Not all the wrongs of the world can be put right， but where disorder threatens us all， we should act.
Like it or not， whether you are a utilitarian or a Utopian， the world is interdependent. One consequence of this is that foreign and domestic policy are ever more closely interwoven.
